We explore three hypotheses for why children differ from adults. The simplest explanation is that the difference lies in how children and adults verbalise their judgements. Children may not be as competent as adults in expressing complex judgments such as a ‘yes, but…’ or ‘half right, half wrong’ as opposed Compound C research buy to simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In this case, young children may default to a simple ‘yes’, and we would expect that the rates of indirect objections will rise along with verbal ability. Another explanation concerns personality traits that develop over time. On our
account, the defeasibility of pragmatic meaning interacts with a decision that must be made at a meta-linguistic level: whether to reject the utterance as worse than optimal, or accept it as better than false. We would expect personality factors such as cognitive flexibility or pedantry to contribute towards the group difference between children and adults, as well as individual
differences between participants. Recent research suggests that the prevalence of autistic traits (Nieuwland, Ditman, & Kuperberg, 2010) and participants’ attitudes to honesty and integrity (Bonnefon, Feeney, & Villejoubert, 2009) may affect their response to potentially underinformative stimuli. A related but distinct explanation concerns children’s certainty about their command of language overall. This could be founded Forskolin on an experience-based account. Children have less exposure to language than adults, and this limited experience may result in them being less GDC-0973 clinical trial certain about their meta-linguistic judgments, and thus accepting underinformative utterances (while having sufficient experience with truth and falsity to reject
semantically false utterances). Indeed, research in the referential communication paradigm and on children’s certainty about their interpretation of ambiguous messages (Robinson & Whittaker, 1985) could inform these hypotheses. These accounts should be empirically testable in future work. Many thanks are due to Elizabeth Line, Helen Flanagan and Nafsika Smith for their assistance with the greater part of data collection. NK would like to acknowledge the support of the Arts and Humanities Research Council (Ref: AH/E002358/1), the British Academy (SG-47135), the Isaac Newton Trust, Cambridge, the European Union’s COST Action A33 ‘Crosslinguistically Robust Stages of Children’s Linguistic Performance’ and the ESRC ‘Experimental Pragmatics Network in the UK’ (Ref: RES-810-21-0069). DVMB is funded by a Principal Research Fellowship from the Wellcome Trust (Ref: 082498/Z/07/Z). We thank the audiences of Experimental Pragmatics 2007, Berlin, RASCAL 2009, Groningen, and BUCLD 2009 for helpful comments.