This raises the question of the roles played by the “Sense of Agency” (SoA) and the “Sense of Ownership” (SoO). The SoA is commonly considered a constituent of the sense of self and the conscious agent refers to it as the feeling

of being causally involved in an action (Gallagher, 2000). Recognising oneself as the cause of an action requires specific mechanisms in the brain to link inner intentions for voluntary action with a body- or brain-dependent execution. Both are inner feelings that we consider essential for consciously deciding, executing and controlling our actions. Neuroimaging studies have previously provided support for the learn more existence of a discriminating system, which enables the subject to attribute to himself or not the responsibility for an action in the brain (Farrer and Frith, 2002, Mcguire et al., 1996, Ruby and Decety, 2001 and Spence et al., 1997). The capacity to discriminate between a first-person or third-person action perspective is finely modulated by specific brain areas (Farrer et al., 2003). It has been demonstrated that a lesion causing spatial neglect interferes with self-recognition of the body in movement

(Daprati, Sirigu, Pradat-Diehl, Franck, & Jeannerod, 2000). As a scientist I would like to be more optimistic than Searle. For this reason we will propose a psychological model in which, false or not, the identification of CM with a “free-from-causes” entity and the idea of possessing FW are both conditions suitable to foster cognition (cf. Bignetti, 1994, Bignetti, Dorsomorphin 2001, Bignetti, 2003, Bignetti, 2004 and Bignetti, 2010). In this paper the compatibility of the new model with current literature is then analysed. We usually consider the purpose of an intentional action as premeditated only if we evaluate it objectively and intellectualize it (third-person perspective) whereas the very instant we do something we are beset with the sensation of having “wanted” and caused it. We believe we have freely “chosen” the final action Exoribonuclease from among various options. This is the basic

premise for the existence of FW (first-person perspective). “The Bignetti Model” describes the sequence of events of a voluntary action as having 5 stages: (1) The so called “voluntary” action is decided and performed by the agent’s unconscious mind (UM) by means of probabilistic responses to inner and outer stimuli. A good example of a “voluntary” action whose timing can be analysed using TBM is reported in Fig. 1. On the basis of a probabilistic mechanism, the UM carries out its best actions in response to a stimulus. After a short delay, the feedback signals from this series of events awaken the CM in order to give it the opportunity to witness the events. Immediately, the CM is invested with the feeling of having decided them.